The question that motivates the essay is, "How should democrats treat difference?" How, that is, might a polity deal with social differences in ways that promote, rather than undermine, key democratic norms, such as collective self-determination and political equality and inclusiveness? Most contemporary theorizing that addresses this question is framed by claims that social identities and differences are constructed, fluid, multiple, and overlapping. But in the pages that follow, I make the case that when it comes to thinking about state intervention into problems of identity and difference, the responses that dominate our debates stand in tension with this explicitly constructivist stance. Whether the emphasis is tolerating difference, affirmatively recognizing difference, or encouraging citizens to deliberate across extant forms of difference, most contemporary political theory implies that states might react to social differences without significantly shaping and helping to constitute them.
I argue, to the contrary, that states play a critical role in constructing social identities and differences. They help define, institutionalize, and order the categories and the relations that produce and maintain identity\difference.2 Institutional efforts to deal with difference democratically need to target the points at which it gets produced. Our aim should be, not simply to modify the effects of extant definitions of identity and difference, but to democratize the processes through which these are defined and redefined. This approach requires restructuring the political institutions and the political processes through which states make difference.
I advance this argument by situating it in a particular political context: the twenty-first century American city, chosen because it brings to the fore both the potentialities and the problems posed by relations of identity and difference. In cities, people interact with, and they shape the possible actions of, others with whom they are not friends or close relations; with whom they do not share racial, ethnic, or other deeply constitutive identities; with whom they form neither a community of value nor a community of interest: in short, with strangers. Jane Jacobs famously argued that this "being together of strangers" (Young 1990, 237) has the potential to foster "a feeling for the public identity of people, a web of public respect and trust, and a resource in time of personal or neighborhood need" (Jacobs [1961] 1992, 56). Yet it is an asset grievously threatened when urban identities and differences are mapped in ways that at once define relations of privilege and deprivation and foster a subjective sense of social distancing among interdependent persons and groups (Bickford 2000) . I focus, in particular, on racialized identities and differences, because these push the theorist to engage the role that the democratic state plays, not simply in responding to extant social differences, but in making, re-making, and reinforcing relations of identity\difference.
TOLERATING DIFFERENCE How should democratic state actors and democratic state institutions address problems posed by relations of identity and difference?
Democratic states should tolerate difference, some suggest, both by promoting toleration as a social practice and by finding ways to institutionalize it politically, that is, by finding ways to institutionalize governmental noninterference with some set or range of actions and practices. Tolerating difference means "allow[ing it] to exist... without authoritative interference." It means "pemit[ting]," "suffer [ing] ," "put[ting] up with" (Oxford English Dictionary [OED] 1989) persons, groups, ways of life, beliefs, and communal practices that the majority in a given polity experiences as strange. Toleration is a matter of "making room" for those who are socially defined as different (Walzer 1997, 10-11). In classic liberal accounts, its defense depends upon the delineation of a restricted political sphere outside of which the state cannot legitimately interfere, except in cases in which practices generally defined as extra-political cause harm to others (Locke [1689] 1955; Mill [1859] 1978).3 Religious beliefs and most religious practices, by this view, fall into the extrapolitical sphere. Contemporary versions of the liberal argument for toleration include in this category, more generally, the beliefs and practices constitutive of controversial philosophical and moral systems of belief and value (Rawls 1985 (Rawls , 1993 .
Why might democrats value toleration? Why do some make a case for democratic state toleration of (some forms of) difference? As Bernard Williams notes, this is a question the answer to which is not immediately apparent. "The difficulty with toleration," he writes, "is that it seems to be at once necessary and impossible": impossible in the sense that the circumstances that motivate calls for tolerationcircumstances in which "people find others' beliefs or ways of life deeply unacceptable"-also make it difficult to achieve (Williams 1996). Why should a state "put up with," why should it deliberately refrain from interfering with actions, beliefs, and practices many view as "deeply unacceptable"? The reason offered by early modern defenders of toleration-a reason still urgently relevant in much of the contemporary world-is pragmatic: As a social and political practice, it can enable nonviolent forms of coexistence among those who are strange in the sense that they experience themselves as not sharing identityconstituting beliefs, values, practices, and traditions. Beyond the pragmatic, there are additional democratic grounds on which one might support state policies and political and social practices of tolerating difference. Toleration respects autonomy, which by accounts as otherwise divergent as Robert Dahl's4 and Jurgen Habermas's5 grounds democratic norms of selfgovernment and political equality. What is more, toleration can promote a degree of self-determination for minority groups within culturally pluralistic polities, an important component of legitimate democratic governance by the views of some communitarian theorists (Kymlicka 1989 (Kymlicka , 1995 Walzer 1997) . Arguments for toleration, then, when not purely pragmatic, often rely on appeals to other values, some of which, including respect for autonomy and cultural diversity, play an important role in recent democratic theory.6 4 For Dahl, the "Presumption of Personal Autonomy," i.e., the presumption that "[i]n the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best judge of his or her own interests," together with the "Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests" grounds the democratic "Strong Principle of Equality," i.e., the principle that ... every adult member of an association is sufficiently well qualified, taken all around, to participate in making binding collective decisions that affect his or her good interests, that is, to be a full citizen of the demos. More specifically, when binding decisions are made, the claims of each citizen as to the laws, rules, policies, etc. to be adopted must be counted as valid and equally valid. Moreover, no adult members are so definitely better qualified than the others that they should be entrusted with making binding collective decisions. More specifically, when binding decisions are made, no citizens' claims as to the laws, rules, and policies to be adopted are to be counted as superior to the claims of any other citizen (Dahl 1989 , 100, 105, original emphasis).
5 A positive valuation of autonomy undergirds Habermas's, as well as most deliberative democrats', claims that a collective norm is democratically legitimate only if and to the extent that its articulation is the product of the agreement of all affected as the result of a free, equal, and public exchange of reasons. See the discussion under Deliberating Across Difference, below. 6 The value of toleration can be grounded, as well, in skepticism about the existence of any belief or practice that is true or right, and knowably so. See Galeotti 1993 , Heyd 1996 , and Williams 1996 There are important limits, however, to what toleration can accomplish.7 In a case like that of the cityi.e., in a case in which strangers lead lives that involve both mutual dependence and mutual influencenoninterference is not necessarily benign. In particular, in cases in which plural identities are defined in the context of relatively enduring power asymmetries, "making room" for the stranger can go hand in hand with politically silencing or excluding her. It can go hand in hand with denying her access to the resources and the opportunities attached to full membership in a political society, since to tolerate the stranger is not necessarily to view her human and social needs as needs the polity should meet collectively.
Normative arguments in favor of state toleration as the principal or the unique solution to problems posed by relations of identity\difference are particularly unsatisfying in cases in which the state itself plays a significant role in shaping those relations. Toleration is a decidedly reactive answer to questions of identity\difference; it recommends state action and inaction in response to extant forms of social difference. By definition, it fails to attend to-indeed it deflects attention away from-the role states play in making, remaking, and reinforcing social definitions of identity\difference.
But states do make difference. They help define national identities and differences, for instance, through citizenship and family laws (Stevens 1999). They help define trans-and subnational identities and differences, as well, both indirectly, by shaping the legal context in which non-state agents act, and via direct legal and policy intervention.
A case in point is the set of identities and differences constructed around race in the contemporary American city. As is well known, nothing natural or inevitable grounds either extant racial categories or their extant ordering. Barbara Jean Fields (1990) , among others, has helped draw critical attention to the constructedness of race by tracing its historic origins. Clearly, if race is neither natural nor inevitable, it takes work to maintain it. Race cannot be made only once, that is to say, but needs to be made again and again: "ritually reproduced" in Fields's words (100). State actors, I want to underscore, play a decisive role in enabling that ritual reproduction. They do so perhaps most apparently by institutionalizing race in legal norms, such as racial census categories. They do so as well, and particularly effectively, by mapping race-by lending geographic facticity to social definitions of racial sameness and otherness-and by overlaying racial "mappings" with material inequalities that help define and secure race-based group divisions.
Consider the all-too-familiar characterization of particular urban areas as comprising the "black sections" of a given city. To perceive a place as "black" (or as 7 This is particularly the case when what is being tolerated is not a set of beliefs and practices, but a socially constructed identity. For a thoroughgoing critique of toleration as a response to problems of social identity and difference, distinct from yet not incompatible with the critique presented here, see Brown 2001. "white") is necessarily to experience black-ness (or white-ness) as a social fact. In the U.S., state actors have played a key role in making possible this experience. State actors helped forge the black American ghetto8 through the legal institution of racial zoning during the early part of the twentieth century,9 then through the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,10 and, finally, through zoning laws that, although not explicitly racially targeted, function to maintain established patterns of racial segregation."l Constructing racialized places in which its citizens live and work-in which they experience the social world and develop their interpretations of it-the state has been instrumental in racializing the processes through which people perceive their relations with others and form their social identities.
Thus in the American city, the state-sponsored racialization of place lends durability to racial identity categories by institutionalizing them, not only in law, but also in built forms and in ordered spaces. The state is active, what is more, in defining material inequalities that create relations of privilege and deprivation along these racialized urban boundaries, and that have the effect of localizing collective problems on the "other" side of those boundaries. State actors have played a critical role in subjecting the black American ghetto to systematic disinvestment, for instance, through the Home 8 I deliberately use the term "ghetto," rather than the more euphemistic "inner city" to stress both the involuntary and the racialized character of American urban segregation. A ghetto, according to Loic Wacquant (1994, 236) is "a bounded, racially and/or culturally uniform sociospatial formation based on the forcible relegation of a negatively typed population... to a reserved territory in which this population develops a set of specific institutions that operate both as a functional substitute for, and as a protective buffer from, the dominant institutions of the encompassing society." African-Americans are the group in U.S. history to have been ghettoized most thoroughly and most systematically. They remain the only "hypersegregated" group in major American cities, that is, the only group segregated along five mutually reinforcing dimensions: unevenness, or overrepresentation in some, and underrepresentation in other areas; isolation, or infrequency of contact with non-group members; clustering of group neighborhoods near each other; concentration of these neighborhoods in small areas, producing a high population density; and centralization around an urban core. . Mortgage lending audits show that lenders discriminate against black mortgage applicants, as well, and that both mortgage and business loans are more easily obtained in suburban and predominantly white than in urban and predominantly minority areas, even after controlling for relevant factors such as income, condition of housing stock, and rate of neighborhood turnover. See Squires 1994a, 1994b. Noncompliance with fair housing legislation is largely a product of ineffective enforcement. Even after the 1988 Fair Housing Amendment Act, which strengthened the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) powers of enforcement, investigations are triggered only in response to complaints filed by people who experience discrimination. As critics note, this system grossly undermines effectiveness, given that many commonly employed discriminatory tactics are difficult for private individuals to detect. 15 Postwar urban deindustrialization resulted in the large-scale loss of manufacturing jobs in cities and the expansion there of low-paying poverty;16 and social problems statistically associated with concentrated poverty, such as victimization by violent crime.17 The distributive inequalities that result from these and similar state actions not only produce race-based hierarchies of economic privilege and power, but further-by removing poverty and povertyrelated social problems to the ghettos that the state itself helped create-encourage the racialization of social understandings of collective interests.
Even as state actors worked, and continue to work, to localize collective problems in African-American ghettos, they helped reduce, often minimize, contact across the lines of identity\difference that they mapped. They erected physical boundaries to contact with racialized others, such as highways18 and highrise housing projects.19 They erected legal boundaries, as well, perhaps most significantly land-use restrictions and the political boundaries that define distinct and, for the most part, nonunionized service and clerical jobs (Bluestone 1990 Although different versions of the call for recognition recommend different forms of political organization, on the whole, the politics of recognition depart from the politics of toleration in marked ways. Some proponents recommend special treatment for minorities in public institutions. Some recommend group-specific forms of political representation, even group veto power in instances in which group interests are significantly affected by a potential decision.23 Some recommend broader and relatively enduring powers of self-government for "national minorities" (Kymlicka 1995) . In short, recognition commands not merely "suffering," not merely "putting up with," but actively and publicly acknowledging and supporting (Habermas 1994; Honneth 1992 Honneth , 1995 . Some argue that, in the context of cultural pluralism and social stratification, recognition is needed to ensure the fair representation of the perspectives and the interests of members of oppressed groups (Young 1989 (Young , 1990 . Others suggest that cultures merit public support and protection because they are the necessary context for the development and exercise of autonomy, which, as noted above, grounds a range of philosophical defenses of democratic self-governance (Kymlicka 1989 (Kymlicka , 1995 .
The impulse uniting these diverse positions is summed up nicely by Elizabeth Kiss's (1999) claim that "[a] society is not truly democratic if it imposes on some of its members, as the price of admission to equal protection and status, the requirement that they deny or hide a deeply felt identity" (98).24
But is recognition, by itself, an adequate form of democratic state intervention into relations of identity\difference? To answer this question, it might be instructive to return to the example introduced above (an example largely neglected by most proponents of the politics of recognition) and to consider what likely would be accomplished by democratic state recognition of American racial differences. What would be accomplished, that is to say, if-after mapping white\black identities and differences, after overlaying racial distinctions with material inequalitiesAmerican state actors were then to take steps to recognize African-Americans?
Affirmative acknowledgment of and support for black American traditions and achievements, although no doubt valuable in some instances for the very reasons advanced by proponents of the politics of recognition, by themselves would fail to challenge those forms of social differentiation that are rooted not only and not most basically in a sense of the relative value of various "cultures" and their products, but in laws and other public institutions, in spatial forms, in architectural constructions that lend a significant material dimension to the ways in which identity\difference is defined. Nancy Fraser has argued persuasively that, although analytically distinct, in practice, the material and the cultural dimensions of injustice are often deeply imbricated. Redressing injuries along one dimension, 24 What is more, absent significant challenges to statesponsored race-making, the various institutional reforms advocated by proponents of the politics of recognition are unlikely substantially to alter extant racial hierarchies. To empower black urban residents with rights to self-government-a process that, as Will Kymlicka (1995, 27-30) notes, involves the devolution of authority to localities in which minorities are territorially concentrated-would fail to enable them to address urgent problems generated across municipal boundaries, such as limited opportunities for work and schooling, an insufficient stock of affordable housing, and the lack of physical safety and security that plagues many urban neighborhoods. Nor are group veto power or representation rights unambiguous means to grappling with problems such as these: that is, problems generated beyond, but most intensely experienced within city boundaries. Due to the forms of mutual influence and the interdependencies characteristic of city life, multiple social collectivities defined as "different" from dominant groups-multiple collectivities the members of which often experience their interests as divergent, even conflicting-are affected by many, if not most, potential decisions. Hence, to recommend that veto power be accorded representatives of significantly affected "oppressed groups" (Young 1990, ch. 2) is arbitrarily to favor the status quo. And group-based representation, although it might place otherwise unrecognized needs and interests on the agendas of legislative and other bodies authorized to address them, would do little to redress the forms of social distancing that undermine 25 "Affirmative" remedies to injustices of misrecognition, Fraser's claim is, because they leave intact underlying identity\difference categories, can undermine strategies aimed at correcting other forms of injustice, especially injustices of distribution, e.g., by fueling resentment for the group marked "other. More generally, calls for state recognition of social difference are, not unlike calls for toleration, reactive; they imply that the challenge for the democratic state is to respond to those differences it innocently happens upon. Recognition theorists' near-exclusive focus on what they term "cultural groups"-that is, their emphasis on collective efforts to reproduce across generations valued linguistic, religious, and other social practices, combined with their "groupist social ontology" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 31)-deflects attention from the political processes through which identity\difference categories are defined, institutionalized, and ordered.
DELIBERATING ACROSS DIFFERENCE
It is, in part, a dissatisfaction with politics that tend to reify and to indurate identity-based divisions that drives calls, not to affirm and to support difference, so much as to engage it in reasoned deliberation. Drawing on Arendt ([1962] 1990), as well as on recent work by Rawls (1993) and Habermas (1984 Habermas ( , 1989 Habermas ( , 1990 Habermas ( , 1993 Habermas ( , 1996 Habermas ( , 1998 , deliberative democrats make the case for reasoning across difference with a view to bridging it, achieving mutual understanding where once valueand interest-based divisions reigned. Legitimate democratic politics, by this view, take the form of communicative exchanges that are at once reasoned, free, egalitarian, inclusive, and public.27
Proponents of this view offer a range of reasons why democrats should deal with difference deliberatively. Deliberation, some suggest, by fostering an active and respectful engagement with difference, can enable interlocutors to recognize the partiality of their own perspectives and their situatedness within larger social relations and contexts (Young 1996, 2000) . Deliberation is likely, some claim, to produce political outcomes objectively better than those that result from nondeliberative processes: decisions shaped by authentic, rather than distorted interests (Sunstein 1988) or decisions that approximate "truths concerning justice" (Estlund 1993 (Estlund , 1476 . Others emphasize the ways in which deliberation might promote social stability, by eliminating conflict that is merely apparent rather than real, and/or by fostering continued cooperation based on mutual respect, even in the face of ineliminable conflict (e.g., Guttman and Thompson 1996). Specifically democratic arguments stress the ways in which the decisions that result from deliberation embody the consent of those 27 I will not provide a detailed review of the literature on deliberative democracy in this essay, not only because of space limitations, but also because the literature is, by now, quite well-known. Some important statements of normative arguments supporting deliberative democracy are Benhabib 1996, Cohen 1989, Dryzek 1990, Elster 1984, and Manin 1987. they bind (Habermas 1990 (Habermas , 1996 and reflect the voice and the contributions of all citizens and/or affected persons (e.g., Bohman 1996) . Thus, faced with the interdependencies and with the forms of mutual influence experienced among strangers in contemporary urban contexts, some democratic theorists would make the case for state institutional reforms that promote the deliberative ideal of a free, equal, and inclusive public give-and-take of reasons, which aims to transcend difference and to achieve mutual understanding. Evidence suggests that, at least some of the time, deliberation can help to increase people's knowledge and understanding of political problems and processes and to foster both understanding and cooperation across lines of difference.28 On the other hand, some case studies document nontrivial instances of political exclusion, distorted communication, and unequal participation in deliberative processes,29 and a fairly wide range of social psychological evidence suggests that deliberation in practice can fail to promote, can even undermine, democratic ideals.30 These disparate findings do not contradict each other so much as speak past one other. It is difficult to adjudicate deliberative theorists' causal claims, because so little systematic empirical work on deliberation has been done.31
What seems most likely is that a range of circumstances affects whether and to what extent deliberative processes encourage the democratic negotiation of difference. When states materially inscribe social difference, when states prompt citizens to experience constructed differences as significant and durable features of their social world, when states shape citizens' felt needs in ways that secure identitarian divisions, then deliberation alone is an inadequate democratic state response. To understand why, imagine two hypothetical pairs of interlocutors and two hypothetical topics of argumentation.
1. A middle-class, childless, white, male professional, who lives in an exclusive suburban municipality on the outskirts of the city in which he works, engages in debate with an unemployed African-American mother of three school-aged children, who lives in a ghettoized residential neighborhood in that same city. The topic is how best to address failure in the city's public schools, and in particular whether metropolitan-wide redistributive policies to help address this problem are in order. 2. A middle-class, white, male, academic philosopher engages in debate with another middle-class, white, male, academic philosopher. The topic is the meaning of social justice.
Clearly, these hypothetical exchanges might differ along an almost-infinite number of dimensions. I want to propose and to highlight just three possible sets of differences, however, in order to make the case that state efforts to respond deliberatively to some relations of identity\difference can fail to advance, perhaps can undermine, democratic aspirations. First, suppose that the urban interlocutors-let's call them John and Mary-are separated by social inequalities, including inequalities of income, wealth, educational attainment, and occupational status. As critics of deliberative theory have argued (e.g., Fraser 1992; Sanders 1997), social inequalities can translate into deliberative inequalities. Suppose that John, more so than Mary, has access to material resources, to information, and to skills socially necessary for effective participation in public debate. Suppose, further, that the philosophers-let's call them John and Jiirgen-are not separated by inequalities that are significant from this deliberative standpoint. In such circumstances, to promote equality within the deliberative setting without eliminating it outside the context of deliberation indeed might render more democratically legitimate the debate between the philosopher, John, and his interlocutor, Jiirgen. However, due to material inequalities that are in significant part the product of systematic state disinvestment in the ghetto in which Mary lives, it might fail to reduce, might even exacerbate suburban John's political advantage.32 32 Some deliberative democrats have replied to egalitarian critiques along these lines by proposing that deliberative reforms be accompanied by redistributive policies: policies that grant all citizens the resources, including the educational resources, they need to ensure their equal capacity to make effective use of opportunities to deliberate (e.g., Bohman 1996, ch. 3). This proposal, of course, if applied to the case of the American city, amounts to a proposal for a massive redistribution of resources. The claim is no longer that deliberation alone is an adequate democratic state response to problems of identity\difference. Nor is it clear that this response answers fully the egalitarian critique. To the extent that the state institutionalizes difference in a spatial order that defines the very social contexts in which actors acquire their linguistic dispositions, even large-scale resource redistribution may not be enough. Suppose that John and Jiirgen inhabit a significantly overlapping set of communicative dispositions, which they share with most members of their audience. Suppose, as State-defined material inequalities can affect the extent to which deliberation serves as a democratically inclusive and egalitarian response to problems posed by identity\difference. Interlocutors' understandings of the social world can affect deliberation's democratic potential, as well, by promoting or by inhibiting the specific forms of communicative engagement that make possible mutual understanding across lines of difference. In the American city, recall, the state institutionalizes racial difference in place. It actively helps construct and maintain racialized places in which its citizens live, and in which they develop their social identities and, more generally, their understandings of the social world. Let us assume, then, that although John and Jurgen may be separated by some significant forms of social self-understanding (perhaps they experience themselves as belonging to different national identity groups), they are joined by a felt sense of identification through other collectivities that are central to their lived experience of the social world: collectivities defined, for instance, with reference to profession or political ideology. Suppose, in contrast, that suburban John and Mary's experience of their relation to one another is predominantly one of not sharing values, perspectives, beliefs, needs, or interests. In these circumstances, deliberation between the philosophers is significantly more likely than debate between the urban strangers, to find support in the "settled convictions" (Rawls 1985, 288 ) that deliberative theorists claim help reduce disagreement. It is more likely to find support in the shared values deliberative theorists hope will lend moral judgments both concrete substance and motivational force (Habermas 1990 , 109) .
Assume, finally, that the exchange between John and Jtirgen is sufficiently general, abstract, and "relieved of the pressure of action and experience" (Habermas 1984, 25) , that neither party's felt interests are placed on the line. Suppose that the dialogue involving the urban interlocutors, in contrast, centers on a political problem that the state-through its tax laws, its definition of municipal and school district boundaries, and its constitutional interpretations of federal, state, and local governments' roles in providing public education33-has defined such that both parties experience it as significantly affecting their interests, and in ways that are mutually conflicting. Although it is not inconceivable that the latter exchange might help uncover previously unrecognized common ground, it seems at least as likely that it will end with the need to make a decision, absent agreement. John and Jiirgen, separated by philosophical differences that they need not resolve, can approximate an ideal of "deliberative disagreement" (Guttman and Thompson 1996), engaging indefinitely in argumentative exchanges characterized by careful attention to, and respect for, each other's positions. John and Mary, on the contrary, are likely to find their dispute resolved, absent consensus, by a collective decision the legitimacy of which cannot be judged by purely deliberative criteria (Mansbridge 1996) .
To avoid misunderstanding, I do not mean to suggest that the deliberative obstacles facing Mary and suburban John are insurmountable. If state actors construct and maintain an African-American ghetto, if they systematically subject that ghetto to disinvestment over the course of a century, and if they then bring ghettoized black citizens together to deliberate with their white neighbors, it is not inconceivable that interlocutors occupying John's and Mary's social positions might overcome state-imposed impediments to achieving mutual understanding. But it seems unwise to bank on it. Critics of deliberative theory have argued that many of its best-known proponents conceptualize difference in ways that are "overly cerebral" (Phillips 1996): as "worldviews," "definitions of the good," or "conceptions of justice." These cerebral understandings of difference, it is worth stressing, they contextualize within a supposed deeper "overlapping consensus" (Rawls 1993, 133-72) about values, and domesticate with visions of liberal "forms of life" that "meet... halfway" (Habermas 1990 , 109) the consensual norms reasoned dialogue is hoped to yield.
But when difference is less a matter of incorporeal beliefs and values, and more a set of relations that the democratic state has institutionalized in place, in law, in material structures, then for the state to deal with difference democratically requires more than a deliberative response. It requires critical attention to, and action directed at, the institutions and the processes that shape the ways social actors define and maintain identity\difference.
MAKING DIFFERENCE DIFFERENTLY
In the first three sections of this essay, I made the case that democratic theorists concerned with relations of identity\difference miss something important when we focus exclusively on questions about how states should respond to the differences social boundaries create. In the remaining pages, I want to sketch what seems to me a more promising approach, one that attends not only to questions of how states should treat extant relations of identity\difference, but also to questions about how states make difference and how they might make difference differently. Through what political processes, that is to say, do states define and maintain the boundaries that make social differences (where boundaries mean not only material structures, but also legal and other norms, including state laws and policies and public institutional rules and guidelines)? How might states restructure those processes in ways that promote, rather than undermine, democratic principles of politically egalitarian and inclusive norm-making? I argued in the first section that mutually reinforcing and relatively impermeable boundaries in the contemporary city make and remake difference in ways that racialize the places social actors inhabit, localize problems defined across municipal borders, and deny to some of those they affect the means to change them. Implicit in this account is a normative claim that I now want to state more explicitly. Boundaries can define relations of identity\difference in ways that are more, or less, democratic. They function more democratically when they sort in ways that are relatively nonhierarchical; when they are amenable to change by those they affect; and when they are permeable, so that the identities and the differences they produce are made present to one another. Boundaries function less democratically when they sort in ways that define relations of privilege and deprivation, power and powerlessness, dominance and marginality; when they are relatively resistant to democratic contestation and change; and when they render difference invisible to identity, creating seemingly unbridgeable distances among interdependent persons and groups.
Democratic theorists concerned with questions of identity\difference need to ask how states create difference-defining boundaries in ways that are antidemocratic in this sense. In the case of the American city, the processes of racial zoning and systematic disinvestment through which the state helped forge the black ghetto were key to racial difference-making through much of the twentieth century. To understand processes of antidemocratic boundary-making in the twenty-first century American city, it is important to attend to the historic devolution of boundary-making and boundary-mapping authority, from federal and state to local bodies. Although the U.S. constitution grants local governments no explicit powers or rights,34 state and federal legislatures and courts have ceded them significant authority. This abdication, in the wake of state-supported racial ghettoization, enables and encourages the definition of hierarchical and relatively durable and impermeable urban boundaries. Consider, for instance, the shift from early nineteenth century state support for urban annexations of surrounding territory, to twentieth century legislative and judicial enablement of municipal incorporation and support for legal defense against annexation. Combined with state grants of authority to localities to engage in exclusionary zoning,38 to set admission policies for and to fund local public schools,39 and, more generally, to raise and to spend taxes providing services for residents only, these forms of decentralization enable the formation of majority-white, suburban enclaves, legally defined as distinct municipalities, and empowered to determine policies that profoundly affect ghettoized African-Americans without including them in the relevant decision-making processes.40
Democratic theorists concerned with questions of identity\difference need to direct our attention to processes such as these: processes through which states make difference. To understand what we miss when we fail to do so, consider participatory democratic calls for radically decentralizing urban political decisionmaking, especially common in the 1970s and the 1980s. Similarly, although the Mount Laurel decisions pose a significant challenge to anti-democratic boundaries, these are the exception, rather than the rule. State and federal courts have played an historic role in promoting local autonomy in the context of both urban racial ghettoization and gross disparities in urban compared with suburban political and fiscal capacity. Tellingly, more than a quarter-century after the first Mount Laurel case, neither this landmark decision nor the legislation it helped inspire has been replicated by other states or by the federal government.
Thus, the decentralization of political authority to localities-the solution that has been a staple of postwar participatory democratic thinking-is likely to exacerbate power inequalities in the fragmented and the socially segmented metropolis. At the same time, the most readily apparent alternative, the recentralization of key urban governance functions to the metropolitan, regional, or state level, will not necessarily perform better, judged by democratic criteria. How can the state make difference differently?
The account sketched above suggests that, although the centralization of some planning, fiscal, and serviceprovision functions is (as argued by proponents of regionalization) key to any plausibly democratic approach, it is crucial to search, as well, for ways to democratize the processes through which the state makes and maps difference-defining boundaries. If the definition of the urban demos in terms of place of residence enables the political silencing and the exclusion of nonresidents who are significantly affected by decisions taken within a municipality, then it is important to develop alternative ways to define the demos. If nonpublic actors and democratically unaccountable special purpose governments perform significant difference-making functions, then it is important to develop mechanisms for subjecting these to democratic control or, alternatively, for transferring their authority to accountable public agents. If status quo definitions of municipal and other political borders help to reify and to indurate hierarchical definitions of identity\difference, then it is important to consider ways in which these might be opened to democratic challenge and change.
Some political theorists-perhaps most notably Iris Young (1990, ch. 8; 2000, ch. 6) and Susan Bickford (1999, 2000)-have begun promising work thinking about these sorts of reforms. To my knowledge, however, the most sustained theorizing along these lines has been done by legal scholars. Gerald Frug (1999, ch. 4), for instance, proposes a regional legislature comprised of democratically elected municipal representatives who are empowered to determine the scope of authority of local government. Legislators, he suggests, should be elected not only by residents of the localities that they represent, but by all citizens who opt to cast a vote in their local elections. Drawing on institutional innovations developed in the European Union, Frug (2002) makes the case that this legislature should adopt qualified majority voting (to ensure that all cities are represented and population is taken into account, without enabling the domination of decisionmaking by one or a few large municipalities); party representation (to encourage alliance-formation across municipal borders); and project-based redistributive programs analogous to the EU's structural funds (to broaden political support for redistribution, to encourage the articulation of needs in ways that educate others about them, and to foster cross-border alliances). Thinking along similar lines, Richard Ford (1994 Ford ( , 1996 makes the case for opening all local elections to all citizens in a metropolitan region or state, regardless of place of residence, and simultaneously introducing a cumulative voting scheme.43 He recommends, as well, regular referenda (decided, again, by cumulative voting) to determine changes to local municipal boundaries (Ford 1994 (Ford , 1911 . And he proposes the democratization of all public and nonpublic bodies that make and enforce quasi-governmental regulations and rules.
Although a detailed analysis of these proposals is beyond the scope of this essay, it seems that one important strength of both Frug's and Ford's approaches is that they challenge local political autonomy without appealing to the ignis fatuus of a centralized state actor who can be relied upon to champion the cause of the disempowered. Both acknowledge, further, that people are affected by decisions taken not only within, but also across the borders of the municipalities in which they reside. Thus, Ford's recommendation that we detach our definition of the urban demos from place of residence would enable citizens to cast votes, not only in the local elections of the cities in which they live, but also in local elections of those municipalities where they work or shop, or perhaps those where they would like to live or work or shop, but cannot, due to exclusionary zoning. It would enable citizens to participate in elections in whichever localities they experience as significantly affecting their lives, in Ford's (1994 Ford's ( , 1909 The political status quo encourages citizens to conceive their political interests as tied to the places where they live: places that the state has had an active hand in helping racialize. For the privileged, it enables an understanding of political needs in terms of keeping "their" problems outside "our" borders. Ford's proposal, in contrast, would encourage citizens 43 The basic idea behind cumulative voting is that voters are given multiple votes, which they can distribute as they choose, in order to reflect the intensity of their preferences. Suppose, for example, that in a given metropolitan region there are 10 local elections. If each voter were allocated 10 votes, some might choose to cast one vote in each election, while others might choose to cast five votes in each of two elections, and still others might opt to cast all 10 in a single election. On cumulative voting generally, and especially on the advantages it offers numerical minorities, see Guinier 1994. to understand borders themselves as the product of ongoing and revisable political decisions. Both his approach and Frug's have the advantage of encouraging people to understand their own political needs and interests-as well as those of others-as crossing political borders, perhaps changing from election to election. What is more, Frug's highlights the importance of structuring both competition for political office and legislative and other decision-making processes in ways that promote coalition-building and alliances across extant political borders.
In citing these proposals, I do not mean to endorse them unequivocally. Absent practical experiments involving these types of reform, it is difficult to predict what their effects would be. As Richard Briffault (1996) has argued, powerful suburban interests might dominate Frug's proposed legislature, rendering it a relatively ineffective vehicle for challenging important difference-defining boundaries, such as zoning laws. Similarly, to allow voting across borders might reinforce the advantage of powerful suburban actors, whom Briffault argues would be better positioned than urban voters to form coalitions in order to influence particular elections. In his own elaboration of proposals for change, Briffault is more centralist than either Ford or Frug and, also, more focused on egalitarian outcomes, as opposed to democratic processes. He argues not only for removing land use, fiscal, and infrastructural decisions to the regional level, but also for redrawing municipal boundaries periodically (much as boundaries defining congressional districts are redrawn), with a view to promoting a rough interlocal parity in fiscal capacity.
There are at least two difficulties with this proposal, however. First, for the reasons outlined above, there seems little reason to think that centralized state agencies would enact it. Second, even if they did, there is little reason to think citizens would view the change as legitimate, unless they already were of the view that municipal fiscal equality is an important political aim. In terms of Briffault's critique of Frug and Ford, it seems likely that he overestimates the extent to which suburban voters share an essentially fixed set of political preferences. No doubt some people who live in particular suburbs of particular cities experience their interests as competing, even conflicting with those of other suburban residents. No doubt, more could if political coalitions were constructed in ways that cut across extant urban/suburban divides. One valuable contribution Briffault's critique does make, however, is that it helps highlight the importance of structuring electoral incentives and collective decision-making processes so that political elites are encouraged both to frame and to address problems in ways that cross extant lines of social difference.44 Whether Frug's specific proposals for project-based programs and party representation are best suited to this task remains to be seen. But 44 On the role of elites in mobilizing understandings of identity and difference for political gain, and on institutional approaches to structuring incentives so that they do so in democracy-enhancing ways, see Shapiro 2003, ch. 4.
